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In 2004, the English Department of Health introduced a technology (Choose and Book) designed to help
general practitioners and patients book hospital outpatient appointments. It was anticipated that remote
booking would become standard practice once technical challenges were overcome. But despite political
pressure and ﬁnancial incentives, Choose and Book remained unpopular and was generally used reluc-
tantly if at all. Policymakers framed this as a problem of ‘clinician resistance’. We considered Choose and
Book from a sociological perspective. Our dataset, drawn from a qualitative study of computer use in
general practice, comprised background documents, ﬁeld notes, interviews, clinical consultations
(directly observed and videotaped) and naturally occurring talk relating to referral to hospital in four
general practices. We used strong structuration theory, Giddens’ conceptualisation of expert systems,
and sensitivity to other sociological perspectives on technology, institutions and professional values to
examine the relationship between the external environment, the evolving technology and actions of
human agents (GPs, administrators, managers and patients). Choose and Book had the characteristics of
an expert system. It served to ‘empty out’ the content of the consultation as the abstract knowledge it
contained was assumed to have universal validity and to over-ride the clinician’s application of local
knowledge and practical wisdom. Sick patients were incorrectly assumed to behave as rational choosers,
able and willing to decide between potential options using abstracted codiﬁed information. Our analysis
revealed four foci of resistance: to the policy of choice that Choose and Book symbolised and purported
to deliver; to accommodating the technology’s socio-material constraints; to interference with doctors’
contextual judgements; and to adjusting to the altered social relations consequent on its use. We
conclude that ‘resistance’ is a complex phenomenon with socio-material and normative components; it
is unlikely to be overcome using the behaviourist techniques recommended in some health informatics
and policy literature.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
‘Resistance’ to information technology in healthcare
Healthcare depends increasingly on information and communi-
cation technologies (ICTs),whose introduction is oftencharacterised
by limited adoption or adoption followed by abandonment,58 Turner St, Whitechapel,
nhalgh).
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY licensespecially when part of a large, top-down change programme (see
for example (Greenhalgh, Morris, Wyatt, & Thomas, 2012;
Greenhalgh et al., 2010; Robertson et al., 2010; Sanders et al.,
2012)). The health informatics literature tends to explain such
‘failed’ projects in terms of resistance (depicted as an ill-deﬁned
combination of inertia, anxiety and Luddism) and to couch solu-
tions in terms of securing behavioural compliance without ques-
tioning ends. For example:
“.the major challenges to system success are often more behav-
ioral than technical. Successfully introducing such systems into
complex health care organizations requires an effective blend of
good technical and good organizational skills. People who have low
psychological ownership in a system and who vigorously resist its
implementation can bring a ‘technically best’ system to its knees.
However, effective leadership can sharply reduce the behaviorale.
Box 1
Referral to hospital using Choose and Book technology.
At the time of this study, Choose and Book software was
materially accessible from the desktop of GPs and admin-
istrative staff in almost all practices in UK, but the GPs we
studied did not use it themselves. By manually entering the
patient’s NHS number (or, more rarely, by using an auto-
mated link), the administrator called up the patient’s cen-
trally held demographic details from the NHS ‘Spine’. Next,
they selected the priority (‘routine’, ‘urgent’ or ‘two week
wait’ e the last for suspected cancer) and entered a clinical
specialty (e.g. ‘gynaecology’) and clinic type (e.g. ‘infer-
tility’). This generated a preset menu that allowed providers
to be compared on three criteria: distance from the patient’s
postcode, key word (such as the name of a provider) and
indicative waiting time (based on the last 20 appointments
in the system). Clicking on any of the providers on this list
would (in theory) call up information about them from a
directory of services (supplied by providers), including
which specific clinical conditions the clinic covered. The
facility to refer to particular consultants was technically
possible but not usually available in practice at the time of
the study. Once a provider clinic was selected, a referral
letter (typically dictated and typed a day or two later) could
be uploaded onto the system.
Alternatively, the patient could be given (or sent) printed
instructions, including a unique identifier and password,
allowing them to access the above information themselves
by telephoning a dedicated call centre or via the Internet
using the ‘HealthSpace’ personal portal, for which they
needed to register in advance by post. HealthSpace con-
tained a link to the ‘NHS Choices’ website, which offered
three types of comparative information on providers: per-
formance against published indicators (e.g. infection rates,
mortality rates, food quality scores), patient experiences
(bulletin-board postings in similar format to travel experi-
ence websites) and distance from the patient’s postcode.
The website allowed the patient to generate bespoke tables
to allow ‘objective’ comparison of hospitals against their
preferred criteria.
Some services on the Choose and Book system offered
‘directly bookable’ appointments that allowed a time and
date to be obtained immediately, but if the provider’s sys-
tem was not yet integrated with Choose and Book, the pa-
tient was sent a letter by the practice with a reference
number and the hospital’s telephone number to book their
own appointment. Once the hospital service received the
booking (alongwith the referral letter), a decisionwasmade
(usually by an administrator) to accept or reject the referral.
They could also contact the patient to change the date or
time of a directly booked appointment.
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more rapid and productive introduction of informatics technology.”
(Lorenzi & Riley, 2000, page 116)
Healthcare IT policy typically reﬂects this behaviourist framing
by focusing on incentives, sanctions and training (Department of
Health, 2012). In contrast, socio-technical systems theory pro-
poses that technologies and work practices are best co-designed
using participatory methods in the workplace setting, drawing on
such common-sense guiding principles as staff being ‘able to access
and control the resources they need to do their jobs’, and insisting
that ‘processes should be minimally-speciﬁed (e.g. stipulating ends
but not means) to support adaptive local solutions’ (Cherns, 1987).
Socio-technical theory frames resistance to ICTs in terms of poor ﬁt
between the micro-detail of work practices and the practicalities of
using technology. Brown and Duguid (2002) have shown how
technologies in the workplace are embedded in networks of social
relationships that make their use meaningful. The detail of how to
use, adapt, repair or work round technologies is learned through
membership of a community of practice; this social infrastructure
strongly inﬂuences whether and how particular technologies
‘work’ in particular conditions of use.
In this paper we acknowledge this perspective and seek to
complement it with a multi-level theoretical analysis that con-
siders macro forces emanating from government and state
agencies; meso-level networks that mediate these forces; and
micro-level sites of acquiescence or resistance by human agents.
We incorporate selected insights from actor-network theory (ANT),
which conceptualises networks of humans and technologies that
are dynamic and (to a greater or lesser extent) unstable. ANT use-
fully considers human actors’ (and indeed technologies’) behaviour
as a consequence of the overall pattern of inﬂuences generated
across the network.
In this study our preferred analytic lens is structuration theory,
developed by Anthony Giddens (1984). We adopt a layered
ontology, ﬁnding it productive to make distinctions between
structure and agency, and between macro, meso and micro, which
ANT rejects. We integrate technology into the picture, a dimension
that is missing from Giddens’ work (Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010).
We also seek to go beyond Giddens’ abstract concern with social
structures in general and use an empirical case study approach to
look at particular ﬁelds of social relations. This emphasis has many
parallels with ANT’s notion of networks. Taking a layered approach
to the study of relations or networks highlights the ways in which
the interdependencies and interactions that constitute these net-
works are embedded in hierarchical power relations, both near and
distant. Unlike ANT, this ‘strong’ version of structuration theory
carefully distinguishes the agency of humans from that of tech-
nologies (the latter, we contend, can only ‘act’ in a limited way).
Strong structuration theory also considers how the values and
knowledge possessed by both individual and organisational actors
are inﬂuenced by external structures, and how this value-
knowledge nexus informs and inﬂuences their actions, with or
without technologies, in particular social situations (Stones,
2005b). For strong structuration theorists, resistance to ICTs
stems from the human agent, who is positioned in a particular
network of social relations; has a particular identity, organisational
role, set of moral principles, beliefs, capabilities, and so on; and
accords signiﬁcance to technologies in particular contexts.
We sought to apply strong structuration theory to explore
resistance to a nationally mandated healthcare ICT, ‘Choose and
Book’ (a system for online outpatient referrals in England e Box 1),
in terms of the reasoning and actions of human agents and how this
was inﬂuenced both by social structures (especially social andprofessional norms and values and political authority) and by the
material capabilities and constraints of the technology. To that end,
we undertook a secondary analysis of a rich ethnographic dataset
on the use and non-use of electronic records in UK general practice.
The policy context
As with many healthcare ICTs, Choose and Book was linked to a
speciﬁc national policy, described in detail by others (Coulter, 2010;
Dixon, Robertson, & Bal, 2010; Jones & Mays, 2009). The ﬁrst gov-
ernment commitment to providing patients with a choice of time
and date of their hospital appointmentwas in 2001with the Labour
government’s landmark NHS Plan. Choice of hospital was promised
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tients a choice of hospital at the point of referral. It predicted that
introduction of ‘choice’ would reduce waiting times, make the
service more responsive to patients’ needs, promote quality
improvement and increase efﬁciency (and therefore cost effec-
tiveness). The plan sought to introduce competition between pro-
viders via a new reimbursement system that paid hospitals a ﬁxed
tariff price per patient seen. From January 2006 all National Health
Service (NHS) patients referred to hospital for elective care were to
be offered a choice of four or ﬁve ‘clinically appropriate’ local
providers. In April 2008, patients became eligible to choose any
provider nationally who offered care at the national tariff rate and
met standards set by the Care Quality Commission (the govern-
ment’s independent quality regulator).
The assumption underpinning the introduction of patient choice
in referrals was that the option for patients to take their custom
elsewhere (what Hirschman called ‘the power of exit’) was a
signiﬁcantly more effective quality driver than the possibility that
they might complain (‘the power of voice’) e and indeed, that the
potential for ‘exit’ added weight to ‘voice’ (Dixon et al., 2010;
Hirschman, 1970). It is worth keeping in mind the abstract,
decontextualized nature of these assumptions.
Development of Choose and Book, intended to support patient
choice at the point of referral in England, was funded in 2003 via a
5-year, £64.5 million contract to the commercial supplier ATOS. Its
national implementation was the responsibility of a designated
lead within the Department of Health. At the time of this study, its
local implementation was formally the responsibility of primary
care trusts (PCTs). It was anticipated that by replacing the tradi-
tional paper referral with an ‘integrated’ electronic system, Choose
and Book would also [a] be more convenient for patients and GPs;
[b] reduce the number of referral-based enquiries GPs and their
staff had to deal with; [c] lessen the bureaucracy associated with
referrals; [d] reduce ‘did not attend’ (‘DNA’) and cancellation rates
in outpatients departments; and [e] encourage amore standardised
format for referrals (Department of Health, 2004).
Recognising that ‘choice’would be effective only if patients were
informed of the key differences between local (and national) pro-
viders in a particular service, in 2007 the Department of Health
launched a website giving details of these services to allow com-
parison between providers prior to referral (see ‘NHS Choices’,
http://www.chooseandbook.nhs.uk/patients/choosing-your) and a
‘Choosing Your Hospital’ booklet (to be supplied to patients by the
referring GP). This booklet emphasised patients’ right to choice and
encouraged them to report services to their GP if they were not
satisﬁed.
Choose and Book was part of a wider socio-technical network.
This included the National Programme for IT (especially the central
Spine on which patients’ demographic details were held); the
machinery of the New Labour government (with its neoliberal
agenda to ‘modernise’ public services); the Care Quality Commis-
sion and other national regulatory bodies; civil servants who
created the performancemetrics for choice (policy) and Choose and
Book (technology), monitored performance of healthcare organi-
sations against these (e.g. via league tables) and linked them to
ﬁnancial incentives; professional bodies (especially the British
Medical Association); and local managers in PCTs.
This socio-technical network was distinctly unstable during
(and indeed after) our data collection period. The Department of
Health continued to produce reports and electronic updates pur-
porting that Choose and Book was improving ‘choice’ (Department
of Health, 2008). These were countered by letters and articles
published by doctors in academic journals that documented
increased workload and a rise in ‘did not attend’ rates following the
introduction of Choose and Book (Beckingsale & Wallace, 2009;Modayil, Hornigold, Glore, & Bowdler, 2009); patients referred
under Choose and Book who had no recollection of being offered a
choice of provider (Green et al., 2008); and a widespread percep-
tion that the technology was inefﬁcient, inﬂexible, complicated and
politically-driven (Rabiei, Bath, Hutchinson, & Burke, 2009; Rashid,
Abeysundra, Mohd-Isa, Khan, & Sismeiro, 2007).
Late modernity and expert systems
NHS policy changes in the 2000s reﬂected the mindset of late
modernity, with its emphasis on an abstract blueprint for control
that lacked grounding in, or sensitivity to, the details and variety of
local contexts (Giddens, 1990). The predominant frame of reference
was rationalist; there was a strong sense that innovation and
change represented progress, and a particular conﬁdence in the
value of expert systems e deﬁned by Giddens (1990, page 27) as
“[a] system of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that
organize[s] large areas of the material and social environments in
which we live today”; the possible negative consequences of such
technical systems, including their impact on social interaction, was
rarely systematically considered; and designers and policymakers
were orientated to an imagined ‘proximate future’ e a time almost
upon us when the technology is fully functional and all technical,
ethical and political challenges have been smoothed out (Dourish &
Bell, 2011).
The expert system is a relatively recent phenomenon, resulting
from the powerful triad of classiﬁcatory systems, bureaucracy and
information technology in the age of globalisation (Giddens, 1991;
Stones, 2005a). Such systems, which now range far and wide (e.g.
ﬁnance, energy, engineering, medicine), are driven by abstract rules
and procedures designed to co-ordinate social relations across large
distances.
Giddens (1991) proposed that these expert systems, using
technology to encode information and store formal knowledge,
have an inherent tendency to ‘empty out’ the content of local in-
teractions because the technical knowledge they contain is
assumed to have validity independently of any particular interac-
tion, and to have the authority to override situational contin-
gencies. They are designed to exert control and orderemeasurable,
quantiﬁable e over distance in a way that seeks to remove (or at
least, radically attenuate) the ability of distinctive people, relations
and contexts to upset the uniform application of the rules and
classiﬁcatory system embedded in the system. There is a powerful
momentum towards general and universalising rules and pro-
cesses, and away from the application of practical wisdom (what
Aristotle called phronesis) in speciﬁc contexts.
Expert systems capture professional expertise by formalisation
e deploying impersonal knowledge, classiﬁcatory systems and
procedures to shape, monitor, standardise and render calculable
the work they support. Anthropologist Mary Douglas, developing
earlier insights from Durkheim, argued that producing lists, rank-
ings and other classiﬁcation systems helps establish and then
sustain social institutions by introducing conventions that
“describe the way things are” (Douglas, 1986, page 48). Classiﬁca-
tion systems are ﬁercely negotiated and defended for precisely this
reason (Bowker & Star, 1999). They have long been combined with
those bureaucratic forms of instrumental rationality carefully
analysed by Weber (1978). It is the interweaving of these two
systems with powerful information technologies that is new.
The patient as ‘rational chooser’ and the ideology of competition
The classiﬁcatory rules and procedures embedded in Choose
and Book software and its networks assumed that the sick patient
functioned primarily as a rational chooser, able and willing to
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them if provided with high-quality information and decision sup-
port. Managing illness was assumed to consist, more or less, of
making a series of objective decisions based on a limited number of
decontextualised indicators and then following through on these. It
follows from these assumptions that provision of statistical infor-
mation on the ‘quality’ of services in a standardised format (such as
a table of hospital-level comparisons using star ratings on key
metrics) will prompt the ‘right’ choices and that these choices will
lead to the ‘best’ services winning out in a competitive market.
Choose and Book was also inﬂuenced by the abstract ideology of
competition, and by the salutary effects that the competition
blueprint was said to have on cost efﬁciency, patient satisfaction
and patient outcomes. When the policy of choice was introduced,
much attention was paid to the expert system but there was little
exploration of the meso- and micro-level social interactions and
processes that would convert the policy idea (of hospitals
competing to attract outpatient referrals) into the reality of a more
efﬁcient, effective and responsive healthcare system that improved
patient satisfaction and outcomes. Notably, the over-riding inﬂu-
ence of national policy meant that Cherns’ principles of socio-
technical design at local level were not recognised or applied
(Cherns, 1987).
With a view to redressing this imbalance, we sought to analyse
the micro processes and interactions involved in the practice of
referral using the Choose and Book technology. To this end, we used
the theoretical lens of strong structuration theory introduced
above. This focuses on actors who are sited within a ﬁeld of posi-
tionepractice relations that has a powerful presence external to
them, and which imposes itself upon them in various ways. These
external structures pose constraints, provide resources and possi-
bilities for action, and are the source of pressures and forces,
including those of socialisation and induction into cultural mean-
ings and values. Strong structuration theory takes seriously the
hermeneutic, interpretative frames of the actors, theways these are
built up over time, and the way these mediate perceptions of
external reality. But it departs from many forms of social con-
structionism in framing this in terms of the ways in which external
structures are internalised within the interpretive frames of actors.
Key to our current argument is the further division of these
internal structures into two interacting aspects. First, an individual
actor’s generalised dispositions, or habitus, which refers to durable
and deeply socialised aspects of embodied skills, culture, moral
values and principles, and so on, built up over time as an actor is
exposed to, and interacts with, their social contexts. This provides
the phenomenological perspective by which events in the world
are framed and perceived. Second, the actor’s knowledge of the
immediate strategic terrain of positionepractice relations facing
them at any particular time, including knowledge of the potential
functionality of technologies and the sense of how this ﬁts with
other aspects of the terrain. Such conjuncturally-speciﬁc knowledge
may be informed and ﬁne-grained, or (especially if imposed top-
down) it may be ill-informed and broad-brush, risking unin-
tended and unwanted consequences (Stones, 2005b). Internal
structures are an important part of the capabilities of actors, drawn
from or worked upone and in compliance or resistancee by actors
as they engage with the everyday ﬂow of practices.
Resistance as morally-driven human agency
The emphasis of strong structuration theory on values and
norms within the habitus of actors means that humans are viewed
not primarily as rational actors, nodes in a network ormembers of a
socio-technical system but as moral beings who have commit-
ments, desires and values (both personal and professional). It viewswork e especially the work of doctors e not merely as a series of
coordinated tasks but as having symbolic signiﬁcance in society. As
Sayer put it in the title of his book, “things matter to people” e
objects, actions, experiences and relationships have personal and
moral signiﬁcance as well as economic or instrumental worth
(Sayer, 2011).
With this in mind, our analysis set out to explore the tensions
between professional morals and values (inculcated by medical
education, professional identity and professional communities of
practice) on the one hand and the demands made on the GP or
other actor in the here and now by the remote, disembedded expert
system of Choose and Book on the other. In the language of strong
structuration theory, this is a tension between key aspects of the
GP’s value-dispositions (speciﬁcally, the enduring professional
values that form part of an individual’s habitus) and his or her
conjuncturally-speciﬁc (‘here and now’) knowledge of the social
forces and sanctions embedded in the proximate structures of the
Choose and Book technology.
The nexus of ethical values embedded within the habitus of a
healthcare professional is not static or unproblematic. Indeed, it
may be variously ambivalent, fragmented or conﬂicting, reﬂecting
the ethical tensions and inherent conﬂicts of healthcare practice
(Mol, 2008; Schei, 2006). In this paper, we show how an under-
standing of these values and how they inform professional notions
of excellence are a useful point of departure for illuminating those
practices that are framed as ‘resistance’.
Professional values and medicine’s internal goods
If resistance is to be investigated at the micro level in terms of
what matters to human agents (what do they care about; what do
they see as good or bad practice?), we need to consider what
macro-level inﬂuences, shared among members of a professional
community, shape these values and perceptions. MacIntyre
depicted these inﬂuences as the ‘internal goods’ of a domain
(Maclntyre, 1981, p. 216). The internal goods of medicine would
include the Aristotelian virtues, along with the dispositions and
capacities, that are valued by doctors and which they believe are
necessary to sustain standards of excellence in their profession.
It has long been argued by sociologists that because they bear a
commitment to the reﬁned knowledge, ethics and values of their
specialised community, professionals act as a bulwark against the
impersonal march of capitalist and bureaucratic forces (Parsons,
1964). More recently, French sociological theorist Luc Boltanski
has called for policymakers to go beyond ‘neomanagerialism’ and
engage with the moral and normative positions taken by in-
dividuals and groups on particular issues, notably the ethically-
motivated concerns of professionals and lobbyists (Boltanski, 2011).
Medicine’s internal goods are clustered, broadly speaking,
around the themes of caring, curing, and comforting, and are
embedded in the formal and informal codes of practice of the
medical, nursing and other related professions. In the analysis that
follows, we use these internal goods as a benchmark against which
to consider not merely the means by which a referral to hospital is
made (traditional letter or Choose and Book technology) but also
the ends that are in mind when it is made. A GP’s judgements about
referral to hospital have traditionally been directed towards a range
of ends such as access to restricted tests or procedures, specialist
advice in diagnosis or treatment, conﬁrmation that nothing has
been missed, symbolic afﬁrmation of a serious illness, and respite
from a patient whose chronic incurable illness has becomewearing.
GP referrals are informed by [a] knowledge of the patient’s personal
history (both medical and social), [b] knowledge of the workings of
their own health system (including the various incentives, disin-
centives and practicalities of different options), and [c] knowledge
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and the clinical interests and personal style of particular consul-
tants. The ‘expert system’ character of Choose and Book militates
against using such knowledge, placing constraints on the scope of
professional judgements.
A professional framing of medical work sees doctors as wielding
their symbolic power with integrity and commitment with the
patient’s best interests in mind. Patient empowerment notwith-
standing, there are aspects of the unequal relation between doctors
and patients whose legitimacy is socially conferred, due largely to
the fact that illness makes people (in a range of ways) vulnerable
and in need of society’s help (Schei, 2006). Referral decisions are
not merely ‘rational’ (that is, based on the best available medical
evidence) but also practical and ethical, asking whether this
referral, to this specialist at this hospital, is the right thing to do
(Montgomery, 2006, Sayer, 2011). As Dixon et al (2010) showed in
both UK and Netherlands, patients’ choices do not follow the nar-
row economic rationality that policymakers anticipated, but reﬂect
practical and symbolic inﬂuences that are perceived to matter in
particular circumstances (Dixon et al., 2010).
Professional judgement, particularly in primary health care,
relies on being rooted in the immediacies of context. As a strikingly
top-down form of expert system, Choose and Book imposes ab-
stract and generalised protocols that have limited capacity to take
account of local circumstances and contingencies. As Boltanski’s
critique highlights, this socio-technical network crystallises a ten-
dency to ignore or dismiss the skills, concerns and situated
judgements of professionals. This is especially troubling in
healthcare, since medicine is inherently exception-ﬁlled (most
cases differ in some way from the ‘textbook case’) and medicine’s
internal goods are not, in large part, reducible to formulaic rules
and protocols.
Neither technologies, nor the policies and processes in which
they become embedded, are morally neutral, and to be able to
judge the appropriateness and adequacy of particular policy ini-
tiatives and linked technologies, it is necessary to assess how well
they allow patients to receive the levels of care, cure, comforts and
so on they can reasonably expect from the healthcare system e and
support doctors to provide them. Having a clear sense of ‘what good
might look like’ allows us to begin to open up policies and their
socio-technical networks to critical scrutiny.
Research questions
Our research questions were: [1] When referring patients to
hospital, how does the tension between the systemic demands of
Choose and Book as an expert system and the situated application
of local knowledge through practical and professional judgement
play out? [2] To what extent can ‘resistance’ to Choose and Book be
explained in terms of the structure-agency dynamic (speciﬁcally,
the dynamic between attempts to control behaviour from a dis-
tance on the basis of abstract criteria and the local values, judge-
ments and practices of GPs and their staff)?
Methods
The HERO study and the secondary dataset on referral
The idea for this secondary analysis emerged during the
Healthcare Electronic Records in Organisations (HERO) study,
conducted in 2007e10 and funded by the Medical Research
Council, which explored the use (and non-use) of electronic records
in English general practice (Swinglehurst, Greenhalgh, Myall, &
Russell, 2010). It occurred at a time when a number of networked
technologies were being introduced as part of national IT policy.The original HERO dataset covered four practices (anonymised as
Dale, Beech, Elm and Clover) and included around 200 clinical
consultations either directly observed or videotaped (with screen
capture of the electronic record), as well as ethnographic ﬁeld
notes, documents (emails, letters, business plans, protocols, prac-
tice leaﬂets) and naturalistic interviews e that is, asking people
what they were doing and why as part of ethnographic observation
(column 1 of Table 1). Naturalistic interviews provide particularly
useful data in the study of work, since people can best describe and
reﬂect on their work when doing it (Barley & Kunda, 2001).
Our original analysis produced ﬁndings relating to how the
work of GPs (Swinglehurst, Roberts, & Greenhalgh, 2011), nurses
(Swinglehurst, Greenhalgh, & Roberts, 2012) and receptionists
(Swinglehurst, Greenhalgh, Russell, & Myall, 2011) is shaped and
constrained by technologies in use and by prevailing expectations
about who should use them and how. One technology in particular
e Choose and Book e was rarely if ever used as its designers had
intended. Its embedded scripts (the assumptions held by its de-
signers about how peoplewould use it (Akrich,1992)) were ignored
and/or deliberately subverted. When it was used, the consequences
were not as predicted. Most referrals were still dictated, typed and
sent in the traditional way. Furthermore, GPs and administrators
often had strong feelings (usually but not universally negative)
towards Choose and Book and there was much talk of ‘clinician
resistance’. We decided to seek funding for a secondary analysis of
our dataset to explore these impressions further; we obtained this
from the National Institute for Health Research Health Services and
Delivery Research Programme (ref. no. 10/1011/01).
Data analysis
Commencing with the entire HERO dataset (over 800 type-
written pages), we selected a much smaller dataset for further
analysis (column 2 of Table 1). This mainly comprised direct ob-
servations of work practices relating to referral, whether under-
taken manually or with Choose and Book (hence, it afforded a
‘symmetrical’ analysis of both the use of Choose and Book and its
non-use (Wyatt, 2003)). The extracted dataset also included some
videotaped consultations, and documentation produced nationally
and locally over the time period of the original study. In an initial
familiarisation phase (column 3 of Table 1), we produced ﬁrst-order
interpretations in which we sought to describe and offer pre-
liminary explanations of observed practice and to summarise the
assumptions that underpinned policy and were embedded in the
Choose and Book technology.
In a further analytic phase (column 4 in Table 1), we used strong
structuration theory, whose application to the use and non-use of
ICTs has been described previously (Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010).
We focused on the conjuncture e that is, a critical combination of
events and circumstances inwhich the human agent draws on both
habitus (i.e. their internal dispositions, beliefs, values, norms and so
on) and knowledge of the here-and-now situation (i.e. their
assessment of the particular strategic terrain and how they are
expected to act within it), and is supported or constrained by the
available technologies, to inform, execute and justify a particular
course of action.
We considered two kinds of conjuncture: clinical consultations
in which outpatient referrals were initiated and administrative
activities in which staff sought to follow through on such referrals.
In both kinds, the actor (clinician or administrator) either used or
chose not to use (or, sometimes, was prevented from using) Choose
and Book to support the referral in particular ways. We considered
how the actor’s habitus (for example, the doctor’s professional
identity and code of practice, or the administrator’s efforts to do a
good job) combined with their assessment of external
Table 1
Overview of data structure and analysis.
Original dataset from
HERO study 2007e10
Raw data selected for secondary analysis First-order interpretations Higher-order theoretical categories
Field notes fromw200 directly
observed clinical consultations.
25 observed consultations in which
the GP offered or discussed a referral.
➢ Why GPs refer people to hospital
➢ What GPs and patients talk about
when discussing whether and
where to refer
➢ Why GPs do not use the Choose




➢ Medicine’s ‘internal goods’
➢ Economic context
Internal social structures (what
actors ‘know’ and how they
interpret the strategic terrain)
➢ GPs’ professional identity,
values, morals
➢ Administrative staffs’
perceptions about ‘doing a
good job’
➢ Skills and techniques for
using the technology
Social structures inscribed in
Choose and Book technology
➢ Restricted nature of choices
➢ Assumptions about GP’s role








6 video excerpts in which a GP offered
a referral. Striking ‘silence’ in the data:
no examples of GPs directly
accessing Choose and Book with
patient present.
Field notes from directly observed
administrative work by
GPs (w40 h) and practice staff
(w330 h), including naturalistic
interviews: total 800 pages of
typewritten notes.
1 case in which a GP attempted to make a
Choose and Book referral without the patient
present; 3 where referral letters
were dictated with no such attempt.
58 cases of administrator
processing referrals manually (n ¼ 12) or via
Choose and Book (n ¼ 46). 45 examples of
naturally occurring talk where referral was
mentioned (13 GPs, 31 administrators,
1 practice manager)
➢ Material properties of Choose
and Book and challenges of using it
➢ Knowledge, skills and workarounds
used by staff to make Choose
and Book ‘work’
➢ Why even experienced staff
sometimes ﬁnd it impossible or
unhelpful to use Choose and Book
➢ What GPs and practice staff care
about when making a referral
Field notes from practice
meetings (w20 h).
Notes from one meeting between supplier
and practice staff (Elm).
15 national policy documents on
electronic records. Information for
professionals and public on
these. National audits and surveys
on electronic record use.
7 policy documents in which electronic
referral was mentioned. Sections of ‘NHS
Choices’ website relating to referral. Referral
guidelines and DVD for GPs. Annual surveys
on ‘choice’ and Choose and Book use.
➢ How and why national
policymakers think ‘choice’
will improve quality of care
➢ Beneﬁts anticipated from
Choose and Book
➢ How much Choose and Book
is actually
used and how much ‘choice’
achieved
>30 semi-structured interviews with
local policymakers on use of
electronic records.
One (joint) interview with two primary care
trust managers charged with implementing
Choose and Book locally.
➢ How local managers think
referral works
➢ Why they think GPs do not use
Choose and Book
➢ How much ‘choice’ is achieved locally
Local documentation on electronic
record use.
4 practice protocols, 10 newsletters, one PCT
patient choice survey, one letter
from PCT to GPs.
Correspondence and emails among
clinicians in ﬁeld sites on
electronic record use.
Email exchange among GPs and PCT leads
(1 thread, 15 participants) including doctors
from Beech and Clover practices.
➢ Advantages and limitations of choice
policy as perceived by GPs
➢ Advantages and limitations of Choose
and Book as perceived by GPs
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to Choose and Book and their perception of what would happen if
they did or did not use this technology). The purpose of this was to
focus in detail on the extent towhich, and theways inwhich, actors
felt enabled and constrained by the material properties and capa-
bilities of Choose and Book (including the role assumptions, cate-
gories, values and other social structures inscribed in the software).
Development of theory and analysis of data occurred concur-
rently, each feeding into the other and informed by interdisci-
plinary discussions. Two authors (TG and DS) are medical doctors
with an interest in the sociology of professional practice and clinical
interaction; the third (RS) is a professor of sociology who has
developed strong structuration theory, and is an acknowledged
authority on the work of Giddens (Stones, 2005a).Main ﬁndings
At the time our primary study began (2007), Choose and Book
had been available for two years. Many practices had invested in
training and additional staff and begun to use it for referrals but had
subsequently reduced their use of it. Of the four GP practices we
observed, anonymised as Dale, Beech, Elm and Clover, the per-
centage of referrals being submitted via Choose and Book was re-
ported to us as 50e60%, 0%, 25% and 80e90% respectively.We never
saw a GP use Choose and Book directly during a consultatione even
in Clover practice, which described itself as ‘top of the [local] league
table’ for percentage of referrals made using the system.Our secondary analysis revealed four analytically distinct but
empirically overlapping foci of active or passive resistance to
adopting the scripts, implicit in the system design, that actors were
required to follow if Choose and Book was to be a success (Akrich,
1992). Each focus highlights a different aspect of GPs’ (or admin-
istrators’) refusal fully to comply, because they believed that
Choose and Book threatened to subvert a dimension of valued
professional commitments. The four foci of resistance were: to the
policy of choice that Choose and Book symbolised and purported to
deliver; to ﬁnding ways to accommodate the technology’s socio-
material constraints and implications; to interference with doc-
tors’ contextual judgements; and to adjusting dutifully to the
altered social relations consequent on its use. We consider these
below. In each case, we summarise and illustrate data from our
direct observations of situated action, then consider the relevant
internal structures of human actors (what actors valued and ‘knew’)
in conjunctionwith what wasmanifest in thematerial properties of
the technology-in-use, and also the corresponding external struc-
tures (political inﬂuences and expert norms that were inscribed in
the technology and/or shaped actors’ practices).Resistance to the policy of ‘choice’
One of our most consistent ﬁndings when observing GP-patient
consultations was that choice of hospital was either not offered at
all or was presented to the patient as an external requirement
(something the GP “had” to do), with GPs often highlighting the
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exasperation (“we’re supposed to offer you St Joan ’s [hospital 20miles
away] or Timbuktu”eGP, Beech practice). We observed a number of
examples in which the offer of choice introduced a distinct note of
confusion into an otherwise smooth conversation, since the patient
could not understand why they were being given the option of
travelling to a distant and unfamiliar hospital. Indeed, GPs
appeared to invoke “the government” or “the computer” as a third
party in an attempt to reduce this confusion. In all cases where
choice of provider was offered, it was recorded on the electronic
record using a distinct code that could later be used to audit the
practice’s performance.
Our informal discussions and naturalistic interviews with GPs
suggested that this recurring pattern appeared to be driven by
three things that GPs ‘knew’: ﬁrst, that the overwhelming majority
of patients wished to attend their local hospital (hence therewas no
genuine reason to offer them choice); second, that the government
was mistaken in assuming that choice of hospital would act as an
effective mechanism to promote competition and efﬁciency in the
NHS (they described the policy as “pointless”, “political”e and even
as “bollocks”); and third, that offering choice was linked to a
ﬁnancial incentive, embedded within the technology, for the
practice (hence there was a perverse reason for offering it). Thus,
GPs were ‘resisting’ the policy of choice by presenting it to patients
as an absurd demand of the system, at odds with their judgement,
and refraining from the active investment of energy that its design
relied upon, while most were also ‘complying’ with it at a super-
ﬁcial, pragmatic level in order to gain the reward.
GPs’ perceptions were, broadly speaking, borne out by our data.
We did not encounter a single example of any patient choosing to
go anywhere except their local hospital, and only one example of a
member of staff who recalled (on a single occasion) such a choice
being made. Neither did we encounter any examples of either
doctors or patients seeking or using comparative performance data
when considering their referral preferences. Tellingly, the capacity
of the technology to generate ‘personalised’ lists of options
depending on whether patients wished to choose by distance, car
parking, food quality and so onwas never instantiated. A facility for
patients to access such data in their local library in the district
where Dale and Elm practice were located had no takers in six
months. Beech practice stopped using Choose and Book when
ﬁnancial incentives ceased.
In terms of the wider social structures impacting on choice of
hospital, our dataset included substantial evidence of attempts to
lever political authority. Locally, PCTmanagers described the PCT as
being “beaten up” by the Strategic Health Authority, which in turn
was (they said) being “hammered”, “bashed” and “kicked” by the
Department of Health. Monthly bulletins from the Department of
Health reported on progress in implementing the policy, and
annual large-scale National Patient Choice Surveys were commis-
sioned by the Department of Health in an attempt to demonstrate
that the technology had been instrumental in achieving the policy
goal (Department of Health, 2010). In these, around half of
responding individuals recalled being offered ‘choice’, but the
response rate was very low.
Resistance to the socio-materiality of Choose and Book
The process of referral was severely constrained in real time by
the material functionality of the Choose and Book technology,
whose operation at the time of our data collection (2007e10) was
cumbersome, unreliable and time-consuming. Our ethnographic
observations conﬁrmed estimates of practice staff that a Choose
and Book referral took, on average, twice as long as a manual
referral. They recounted numerous examples of the technologyfreezing, crashing, running slowly, failing to supply the necessary
password for the patient, requiring manual data entry for some
ﬁelds and (commonly) failing to identify a suitable appointment
slot at the preferred (local) hospital.
Choose and Book referrals were far from ‘paperless’. On the
contrary, they generated large amounts of printed paper, including
internal memos and request sheets, sticky notes, protocols, ﬂow-
sheets, instructions and passwords for patients and e in three
participating practices e a paper ledger of all ‘paperless’ referrals
sent (the fourth entered thesemanually onto an Excel spreadsheet).
In this and other ways, Choose and Book was viewed by practice
staff as worsening the service problems it had been introduced to
solve (e.g. referral bureaucracy, high ‘did not attend’ rates) and as
generating negative knock-on effects (especially, taking time away
from patient care or generating potential security breaches).
Administrative staff considered Choose and Book highly
temperamental, and spoke of having to get to know the system
through accumulated experience and trial and error. We observed
many examples of staff helping one another across a shared ofﬁce
in this regard. They spoke of not trusting the electronic system (or
the organisations and/or individuals with whom it connected), and
of being unable to navigate the system comfortably even when
highly experienced in using it. They spent considerable time on the
telephone to a helpdesk or to their counterparts in the hospital
service trying to over-ride or work around glitches in the system.
Anaspect of this sociomaterialitywas resistance to the expenseof
the Choose and Book system. A few GPs in our sample identiﬁed
positive aspects of Choose and Book (e.g. fewer queries to the prac-
tice about the referral’s progress) but commented that the technol-
ogy was a cumbersome and expensive way of achieving that goal.
In this focus of resistance, the key external structures impacting
on human actors were, on the one hand, the modernist ideal of a
reliable, touch-of-a-button automated system and, on the other, the
reality of technologies-in-use: invariably messy and (in numerous
ways) less than ideally ﬁt for purpose (Brown & Duguid, 2002;
Dourish & Bell, 2011).Resistance to interference with the doctor’s contextual judgement
“I suggest you go to Mr Z [local eye surgeon] because I have [same
eye condition] too and he looks after my eyes” (ﬁeld notes from
observation of consultations, Dale practice).
Our observations showed that when considering whether and
where to refer a patient, the GP routinely drew on his or her per-
sonal knowledge of that patient, both clinical and social, and of
local services, including the scope of particular clinics in particular
localities; the patient’s own history of being treated at a particular
hospital; transport services and the patient’s ability andwillingness
to use these; the expertise and interests of local consultants; per-
sonal experience of referring patients to that service previously;
and even e as in the above quote e personal experience of being
treated by particular consultants themselves.
In the single example we observed of a GP attempting to use
Choose and Book, he abandoned the attempt because he could not
ﬁnd a suitable service (the local one was not listed and he was un-
sure whether clinics at other hospitals provided the particular
procedureneeded). GPs andadministrative staff explained tous that
services in other localities tended to be organised differently e for
example, they called the ‘same’ clinic by a different name or sub-
divided the work of the specialty in a different way, so a GP was
typically very knowledgeable about a local hospital service but
much less knowledgeable about comparable services in other
localities.
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best option for the patient (personal, relationally situated and pro-
fessional knowledge such as the trust and regard which this GP held
for a particular consultant and how that consultant was likely to
manage this condition in this patient) was not the kind available on
the ‘NHS Choices’ website (which provided formal, regularised
knowledge such as scores that had been allocated by a distant third
party for ‘food’, ‘parking’, ‘infection rates’, ‘mortality’ and so on, and
which pertained to the hospital as a whole rather than to a
particular service).
The policy of offering choice of hospital assumed that in
different localities, similar service models with similar names
would be available for a limited menu of diseases or conditions,
allowing the ‘best’ service to be selected easily using a dashboard of
performance metrics. The reality was that patients invariably pre-
sented note or notmerelyewith a ‘textbook’ clinical condition but
with a unique illness along with a unique set of comorbidities,
personal priorities and social circumstances. The abstracted criteria
embedded in the Choose and Book software and NHS Choices
website were far less nuanced. Many GPs described how they gave
up using Choose and Book because it rendered them unable to
apply their knowledge and skills to obtain the best outcome for
their patient. As one observed, “the choice is only of the crudest kind”.
In terms of external structures, this locus of resistance reﬂected
a wider mismatch between what we have called ‘medicine’s in-
ternal goods’ (the emphasis on professionals drawing skillfully and
with wisdom on personal and contextual knowledge to make
practical, ethical judgements) and neoliberal policy (in which the
choices offered are ‘rational’ but lack granularity). The pressure
from policymakers on the medical profession to comply with a
restricted taxonomy of readily classiﬁable disease states that map
unproblematically to particular investigations or treatments re-
ﬂects the kind of technology-work mismatch described by Brown
and Duguid (2002) in a range of work settings. In a more layered
sociological analysis, such mismatch in relation to medical work is
depicted as having political origins and been termed ‘conceptual
commodiﬁcation’:
“External control over medical care requires something more than
literal commodiﬁcation. Rather, it requires conceptual commodiﬁ-
cation of the output of the medical labour process: that is, its
conceptualization in a standardized manner. Such commodiﬁca-
tion facilitates control over the production of services, not just over
the arrangements for their exchange.. The basic strategy of
commodiﬁcation is to establish a classiﬁcation system into which
unique cases can be grouped in order to provide a deﬁnition of
medical output or workload.” (Harrison, 2009, page 190)
Resistance to the altered social relations consequent on use of
Choose and Book
In the consultations we observed directly, most discussions
about referral took a traditional format, with the GP suggesting a
consultant and a course of action, and the patient accepting the
suggestion. One reason why they did not use Choose and Book
during consultations was a reluctance to take on what they viewed
as a more technical (and less professional) role. As one GP put it on
an email exchange about Choose and Book, “We seem to be moving
away from curing, caring and comforting to robotic automata”.
As with the other forms of resistance described above, this can
be explained in terms of internal social structures e speciﬁcally,
professional identity. GPs considered it their professional duty to
recommend a clinically appropriate outpatient clinic, including any
necessary dialogue with the patient about their needs andpreferences. But they deﬁned the technicalities of booking ap-
pointments as outside their scope of practice and associated these
with a loss of status and autonomy that was often deeply held and
strongly expressed (as in the quote above).
This resistance was played out at locality level, between GPs
(largely opposed to Choose and Book) and PCT staff (who were
responsible for implementing the technology locality-wide). PCT
managers did not question the ends of Choose and Book but pre-
supposed that it was ﬁt for purpose, attributing its low uptake to
Luddism and even “spite” (they alleged that GPs’ resistance to the
system was to punish the PCT for ﬁnancial cuts elsewhere). But
when the PCT sent GPs a letter that spoke of “failure” against the
“standard” of Choose and Book and described low uptake as a
“threat to good quality care”, the GPs responded vociferously by
challenging this deﬁnition of quality and the legitimacy of the
metrics being applied. On the contrary, they claimed, they had
abandoned Choose and Book because it was a threat to professional
standards.
Our observational data revealed that the tension between the
professional and the technical was perceived by some administra-
tive staff as well as by most doctors. One administrator in Clover
practice, BN, told us she had decided to take early retirement as a
direct result of Choose and Book. She associated professionalism in
her role with qualities such as knowledge of the services available
locally, and with the ‘family doctor’ relationship that was built
between patients and particular staff through continuity of care:
“The patients have always been my main concern here. I don’t know
where patients are these days e lost under piles of paper and in the
Choose and Book system”.
BN was concerned that patients often phoned the practice
because they did not understand instructions for booking their
appointment. She bemoaned the introduction of a standard
accompanying letter sent to patients with Choose and Book
paperwork (which began ‘Dear Patient’ and was signed ‘Practice
Secretary’) as impersonal (“I could be anyone”), and insisted on
adding her own name and signature to it. But the new system
discouraged such personal touches. As BN commented while doing
a Choose and Book referral: “I need to save this [letter] in Choose and
Book .now what I’m going to do in my capacity as ‘absolutely
nothing’, I’m going to attach it..”.
A few administrative staff, however, were positive about Choose
and Book. The lead administrator at Clover practice, XY, for
example, was a ‘super user’ of the system: skilled, conﬁdent and
keen to help others learn it. She saw Choose and Book’s technical
idiosyncracies as a challenge (“I won’t be beaten by it”) and felt that
its complexity made her job more interesting (“not just mindless
typing”). She took particular pride that the practice was out-
performing all other practices locally for use of Choose and Book.
When some GPs in the practice had advised her to “hold off a bit” on
using the Choose and Book technology because of its questionable
cost effectiveness, her response was “I can’t do my job 50%”.
In terms of dispositional values, BN aligned strongly with the
values of the traditional family doctor service (reﬂecting the wider
social structure of ‘medicine’s internal goods’ described above). In
contrast, XY could be viewed as having positioned herself as a
bureaucratic cog within the expert system, reﬂecting the ‘new
professionalism’ of what Harrison has called scientiﬁc-bureaucratic
medicine (Harrison, 2009), overly detached from the professional
values of the locally embedded general practice, and focused pri-
marily on the efﬁciency of means rather than the value of the ends.
Both national and local policymakers were characterised by a
striking lack of engagement with the values, identities and re-
lationships of general practice. The PCT managers we interviewed,
for example, saw referral as the same administrative process
whether achieved via Choose and Book or a traditional referral (“it’s
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count of the wider changes in roles, responsibilities or identities
associated with the Choose and Book system.
Discussion
This case study of referral to hospital in the English NHS in
2007e10 has revealed a contested social practice driven by national
policy and linked to the use (and non-use) of a nationally mandated
technology. The combination of strong structuration theory, Gid-
dens’ conceptualisation of expert systems, and a hermeneutic and
ethical sensitivity to professional values has allowed us to do the
following. Firstly, we have theorised this phenomenon in relation to
wider social changes in late modernity, as resistance to an expert
system. Secondly, we have constructed an ideal typical conception
of the professional values of those involved in general practice that
articulates the moral bases for their resistance. Thirdly, we have
explored the tensions between these value-dispositions and the
speciﬁc forces and pressures introduced by the abstract system of
Choose and Book.
The various hierarchical orderings (e.g. lists, ratings and rank-
ings) inscribed within Choose and Book and on the NHS Choices
website created potential for policymakers to inﬂuence social re-
lations and practices beyond immediate face-to-face interaction
(‘action at a distance’). But expert systems can produce such action
only to the extent that the people intended to use them actually do
so. If they refuse (for example, because a professional engagement
with the activity depends on embedded knowledge, or because it
reallocates tasks in a way perceived as demeaning and/or irratio-
nal), or are prevented from doing so (for example, when the system
does not ‘work’ or its functionality does not ﬁt the time or space
constraints of the social situation), the intended action at a distance
does not occur.
Our ﬁndings reveal a mismatch between the model of clinical
work underpinning the ‘choice’ policy and inscribed in the Choose
and Book technology and the more complex, granular and
exception-ﬁlled nature of real-world clinical practice. The choice
policy pursued by the English Department of Health depicted
clinical care in transactional rather than relationally situated terms:
it harboured a model of GPs’ input as taking place within artiﬁcially
bounded, unconnected episodes and in relation to overly simple
scenarios. It also used the term ‘quality’ mainly in relation to
discrete and abstractly conceived structures, processes and pro-
cedures. A contextual and professional framing, in contrast, would
emphasise the quality of relationships between patient and doctor
and between GP and consultant (including such things as trust and
positive regard) and the value of continuity of these relationships
over time.
A striking ﬁnding in this studywas policymakers’ andmanagers’
limited understanding of the detail of clinical work and the
knowledge that informs referral practice. It was assumed that GPs
(who, like patients, were depicted as ‘rational choosers’) could be
prompted to use the system through two behaviourist mecha-
nisms: [a] ﬁnancial incentives and [b] disclosure of performance
data (‘naming and shaming’). Policymakers were either unaware of,
or dismissed, the inﬂuence of institutional structures such as the
norms of professional practice, which deﬁned quality in ethical and
relational terms rather than in terms of a state-imposed metric of
compliance with a policy. They also under-estimated the extent to
which the technology’s material properties would prove limiting.
The framing by PCT staff of Choose and Book use as a ‘quality
standard’, and their refusal to engage with the GPs’ concerns about
threats to quality, is an example of the silencing effects that
Boltanski (2011) writes about in criticising neo-managerialism’s
concerted, ill-advised, constriction of the space for meaningfulconversation and debate about the role of normative values in
guiding policy. The managers’ perspective reﬂects a situated frame
of meaning, in which their role is deﬁned in such a way that they
deal solely with implementing means. Theirs is a bureaucratic form
of professionalism, which entails a refusal to question ends and the
values that inform these (Weber, 1978).
We conclude that overly top-down, abstracted approaches to
reducing resistance to information technology are not the best way
forward. Rather, resistance to such technologies and the expert
systems of which they are part would be reduced if there was,
ﬁrstly, a greater recognition and dialogue with the world of pro-
fessional values within its design and implementation, and sec-
ondly, a greater willingness to seek degrees of balance between
such virtual, remote, systems and the exigencies of the local sites in
which professional values are performed. Choose and Book is one of
many expert systems being introduced, top down, in the English
NHS. It is surely time for academics and policymakers to heed
Boltanski’s call to open up debatewith a view to acknowledging the
tension between normative values and forms of order and au-
thority (Boltanski, 2011) (page 155). While coming from a different
theoretical perspective, such an approach would align with socio-
technical theorists’ longstanding call for technologies to support
rather than over-ride themicro-detail of professional work (Cherns,
1987).
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